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Abstract. This paper takes issue with the exemplarist strategy of fostering virtue 
development with the specific goal of improving its applicability in the context of education. 
I argue that, for what matters educationally, we have good reasons to endorse a liberal account 
of moral exemplarity. Specifically, I challenge two key assumptions of Linda Zagzebski’s 
Exemplarist Moral Theory (2017), namely that moral exemplars are exceptionally virtuous 
agents and that imitating their behavior is the main strategy for acquiring the virtues. I will 
introduce and discuss the notions of enkratic exemplars and injustice illuminators and show that 
we have good reasons to consider them moral exemplars although they fail to satisfy (either 
of) the key assumptions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A recently revived discussion in the philosophy of education—more precisely, in character education—
inquires into whether exposure to role models can offer an effective strategy to foster virtue 
development. According to the exemplarist tradition, which takes inspiration from Linda Zagzebski’s 
Exemplarist Moral Theory (2017), admiring exceptionally virtuous individuals, i.e. moral exemplars, and 
thereby becoming suitably disposed to emulating their behavior is a leading strategy in acquiring virtues. 
Yet, unsurprisingly, it is a matter of controversy who, if anyone, counts as a moral exemplar. Those 
who endorse a more restrictive view have it that only fully virtuous agents (moral saints) can be 
considered moral exemplars, whereas proponents of a more concessive view maintain that it is enough 
for one to be a moral exemplar if they be exceptionally virtuous in one specific respect (moral heroes), 
provided that they do not entertain vicious behavior in other respects.  
This paper takes issue with the exemplarist strategy for fostering virtue development with the 
specific goal of improving its applicability in the context of education. I shall argue that, for what 
matters educationally, we have good reasons to endorse a liberal account of moral exemplarity, namely 
one on which moral exemplars need not always be virtuous or imitable. To achieve this goal, in Section 
2, I introduce the standard account of moral exemplarity and Zagzebski’s proposed model for helping 
novices become virtuous via exposure to moral exemplars. In Section 3, after clarifying that my 
liberalizing project falls within the scope and the requirements of character education (§3.1), I motivate 
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a turn to a liberal account of moral exemplarity. First, I show that two paradigmatic categories of moral 
exemplars on a standard exemplarist approach might not be imitable (§3.2). Then, I make a case for 
two non-standard categories of moral exemplars: enkratic exemplars, who lack virtue, and injustice 
illuminators, who fail to be imitable (§3.3). 
 
2. Moral Exemplars and the Exemplarist Dynamic 
 
The exemplarist moral theory is a non-conceptual, foundational, moral theory, in which all the 
fundamental concepts are derived from the notion of a moral exemplar. For example, on Zagzebski’s 
view, a ‘virtue’ is what we admire in moral exemplars, a ‘right act’ is what an exemplar would do, and a 
‘good life’ is the kind of life an exemplar desires for themselves and others.1 This view is particularly 
interesting from an educational standpoint because, as Zagzebski states quite clearly at the beginning of 
her book, she aims at construing a theory that is ‘practically useful. By that, I mean both that it gives us 
directions on what to do and how to live, and it can be used to make us want to do so’ (2017: 3). 
For the purposes of this project, the two fundamental features of moral exemplarism are its 
definition of a moral exemplar and the educational strategies it can offer. As regards the former, moral 
exemplars are defined as most admirable individuals because they are paradigmatically good (20). What 
we admire in them is: (1) the psychological sources of their behavior, rather than the external causes that 
might have contributed to their actions; (2) the acquired psychological features that led them to behave 
as they do; and (3) the motives of concern for others they have more than any motives of self-interest (63-64). 
On Zagzebski’s view, moral exemplars can be distinguished in three categories: moral heroes are highly 
admirable for one specific trait, but not necessarily admirable for others; moral saints are moved by 
altruistic concerns to the extent that we expect them to display not only the virtue of charity but all the 
virtues (96);2 finally, sages are admirable for their extraordinary wisdom (95).3 
As regards the educational strategies proposed by exemplarism, Zagzebski has not offered a 
full-fledged account of moral education. However, the overall applicability of her theory to the 
educational domain is granted by what I have elsewhere called the exemplarist dynamic (Croce 2019: 292-
293). In short, the exemplarist dynamic offers a phenomenological reconstruction of how one can 
acquire the virtues on an exemplar-based approach, and consists of three stages: natural admiration, 
conscientious reflection, and emulation. In the first stage, we detect exemplars by relying on the natural 
operations of our emotion of admiration. Not only does admiration allow us to individuate the 
exemplars, it also makes us formulate a judgment that they are so and, as is clear in Zagzebski’s theory 
of emotions (2003), provides us with a motivation to change attitudes towards the exemplar and their 
deeds, and act as they do in similar situations.  
 
1 For a detailed discussion of Zagzebski’s theory see, e.g., Croce (2019). 
2 Zagzebski’s distinction between moral heroes and moral saints closely resembles the traditional distinction offered in Blum 
(1988). 
3 As an example of a moral hero, Zagzebski (2017: §3) mentions Leopold Socha, whose exceptional courage allowed him to 
rescue a group of Jewish refugees by hiding them in the sewage canals in Lwów and feeding them for more than a year. As 
regards moral saints, Zagzebski points our attention towards the life of Jean Vanier, a Swiss philosophy professor who devoted 
his life to assisting people with severe mental disabilities. Confucius appears to be the ideal candidate for the category of sages.  
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The second stage comprises conscientious reflection, which is the main tool we have at our 
disposal to check up on the natural operations of our emotional dispositions and is key to ensuring that 
admiration has not misguided us into thinking that someone is a moral exemplar when in fact they fall 
short of virtue or, worse, are impostors. Reflecting on whether the object of our admiration fits our 
emotion justifies our trust in the operations of our emotional dispositions, thereby making it rational 
for us to rely on the emotions that survive reflection over time. Given the fallibility of our natural 
dispositions, conscientious reflection is an ineludible step if we wish to be in a good position to achieve 
the virtues by imitating exemplars.  
The third stage is what Zagzebski calls ‘emulation’ (2017: §5), which amounts to a particular 
form of imitation directed towards both an exemplar’s acts and their motives for actions. Emulating the 
exemplar makes us able to adopt their attitude in the situations in which we find ourselves, which can 
well differ from those of the exemplar. The point of emulation is rather to develop a virtuous habitus, 
that is, to form a pattern of response to morally relevant situations as an exemplar would do.  
The educational implications of Zagzebski’s exemplarism have raised several worries about—
among other things—the extent to which the exemplarist dynamic can be applied to all students 
(Tanesini 2016) and the limits of her account of moral admiration (Archer 2019; Szutta 2019; 
Vaccarezza and Niccoli 2019). My main concern is with how we can make the most of exemplarist 
moral theory for educational purposes. The analysis that follows will focus on what it takes to consider 
someone a moral exemplar or, to put it slightly differently, how we should complement or revise 
Zagzebski’s account of moral exemplars to ensure that educators can work with them to foster virtue 
development in novices.  
 
3. A Liberal Account of Moral Exemplarity 
 
3.1. A Methodological Remark 
 
Before attempting to improve the usefulness of moral exemplars in virtue education, it is necessary to 
address a methodological concern with the boundaries of the proposed enterprise. To put it boldly, the 
question is: how much room for maneuver do we have here? Although Zagzebski has provided quite a 
detailed, three-tiered, account of what she takes to be a moral exemplar, she has not offered a full-
fledged account of how her theory could be applied to educational settings. This fact gives us scope for 
revising what is needed to arrive at a more operational account of moral exemplarity. In this paper, I 
shall remain faithful to two main assumptions of character education: first, the idea that promoting 
human flourishing is the main aim of character education and the acquisition of the virtues is a 
necessary condition of flourishing (Kristjánsson 2015: 14); and second, the idea that resorting to moral 
exemplars is not only a legitimate strategy within character education to promote the virtues, but also 
one that—as Zagzebski and others have suggested (Carr 1991; Porter 2016)—is likely to have 
advantages over other strategies.  
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 Nonetheless, one might still worry that departing from Zagzebski’s original account of moral 
exemplars betrays her vision of the educational implications of moral exemplarism. Here are two 
reasons why I do not think that we should worry about this: 
 First, since our project aims at assessing how exemplars can be used in educational settings to 
foster virtue development, it might turn out that educational effectiveness trumps orthodoxy regarding 
(the exemplarist) moral theory. It is to be expected that theoretical frameworks require adjustments 
whenever we want to apply them to real-life situations: even more so when a rather ideal moral theory 
has to be implemented in non-ideal settings like ordinary classrooms. 
 Second, were it to be the case that the liberal account I shall put forth waters down the notion 
of a moral exemplar to the point that it is no longer clear whether we can still talk about an exemplarist 
approach to virtue education, this need not have any consequences at the level of the moral theory. 
Proponents of moral exemplarism could still hold firm to an ideal understanding of moral exemplarity 
and the exemplarist dynamic for theoretical reasons, while conceding that in non-ideal situations some 
moral improvement can arise out of an encounter with less-than-exemplary figures. In short, the very 
fact that there might be reasons for switching to a liberal notion of a moral exemplar from an 
educational standpoint is not in itself revealing of any flaw in the moral theory. 
 In light of these considerations, I suggest that we look at the remainder of this paper as an 
exercise in pushing the exemplarist model to its limit to get a clear idea of how we can maximize its 
educational effectiveness. The alternative account of a moral exemplar that I propose liberalizes 
Zagzebski’s exemplarist theory in two specific respects. On the one hand, I shall challenge the third 
step in the exemplarist dynamic and, in particular, the very idea that emulation is the main way for 
novices to develop the virtues. In contrast, I will argue that some exceptionally admirable individuals 
whom we either cannot or do not wish to imitate should nonetheless be regarded as moral exemplars. 
On the other, I shall challenge the exemplars’ virtuousness requirement, that is, the idea that moral 
exemplars are paradigmatically good individuals. In contrast, I will argue that in some circumstances 
less-than-virtuous agents can well serve the purposes of moral exemplars. 
 The argument I shall set forth comprises two parts: in the pars destruens (§3.2), I will show that 
two traditional categories of moral exemplars, i.e. moral saints and moral heroes, might not be in the 
market for emulation as Zagzebski thinks they are; then, in the pars construens (§3.3), I will offer two 
non-standard cases of moral exemplars, i.e. enkratic exemplars and injustice illuminators, which will 
prove that there is more to moral exemplars than Zagzebski thinks.  
 
3.2. Saints, Heroes, and the Problems with Imitability 
 
Let us first consider moral saints. As we have seen, it is natural to think of them as the paradigmatic 
case of moral exemplars, given the fact that they are meant to possess all the virtues and therefore are 
the most admirable individuals from a moral point of view. On closer inspection, though, it is far from 
clear that saints can perform the role that moral exemplars are supposed to have on an exemplarist 
perspective.  
 5 
 For starters, for the exemplarist dynamic to activate, the novice’s admiration should elicit a 
desire to emulate the exemplar, but it is controversial whether this happens when the exemplary figure 
before us is a moral saint. As Wolf (1982) nicely put it, it might well be the case that moral perfection is 
not a particularly desirable model of personal wellbeing. A life devoted to altruistic ideals will surely 
require complete dedication and will hardly leave room and time for things that, despite being stricto 
sensu morally irrelevant, nonetheless contribute to the fulfillment of one’s wellbeing, such as personal 
interests, ambitions, a sense of humor, and admiration directed towards non-moral objects. Thus, the 
fact that morality is the overarching goal of a saint’s life will ‘require either the lack or the denial of the 
existence of an identifiable, personal self’ (424). These considerations elicit some reservations about the 
extent to which moral saints fit the exemplarist model. 
 Zagzebski considers Wolf’s objection against the desirability of a moral saint’s life and contends 
that Wolf’s notion of a moral saint might fail to fit the exemplarist model not because moral saints 
cannot be imitated, but because they are not admirable in the first place (2017: 25). Zagzebski also 
seems to concede that there might be cases in which we experience a disconnection between 
admiration and the urge to emulate (2017: §6), thereby admitting that the most virtuous category of 
exemplars in her view might fall somewhat short of imitability. 
 We need not arrive at a verdict on the desirability of moral sainthood here, as there is another 
problem that puts enough pressure on the suitability of moral saints for an exemplarist approach to 
education. The worry is that even if we wished to emulate them, we might not be able to do so, in that 
the level of virtuousness they exemplify is out of reach for most of us, limited and distracted human 
beings. This problem is even more pressing in education: with novices, it can be expected that the 
initial drift made possible by the emotion of admiration gives way to a negative emotion, namely 
discouragement, as soon as they realize how far away they are from the impressive deeds of the 
admired saints.  
 The exemplarist might want to defend Zagzebski’s classification of moral exemplars by arguing 
that moral saints set the threshold for moral perfection while it is moral heroes that make the 
exemplarist dynamic work in everyday situations. This consideration surely has a point, in that the 
unique combination of exemplary behavior and moral imperfection typical of heroes provides 
educators with a more manageable category of exemplars. For the very fact that moral heroes excel in 
one virtue but display moral flaws makes them appear closer to our own imperfections, thereby 
revealing that acquiring the virtues requires hard work but might not be beyond our reach.  
As I have argued elsewhere (Croce and Vaccarezza 2017: 8-9), deploying moral heroes on an 
exemplarist approach to education comes with two advantages. First, the educator can quickly direct 
the novices’ attention to one virtue by recalling a specific hero who displays that virtue, while resorting 
to moral saints does not allow for such a convenient virtue-detecting strategy, since it can be hard for 
novices to identify which virtues make the saint appear so admirable. Second, the educator can make 
the novices work on the hero’s flaws of character (or vices) by having them reflect on either the 
negative effects of the hero’s vicious habits or how the hero’s struggles to overcome their weaknesses 
allowed them to become exemplars.  
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All I have said so far about moral heroes supports their suitability for an exemplarist approach 
to education. However, it looks as though there might well be cases in which we cannot or do not want 
to emulate heroes, as we have just seen in the case of saints. One evident limitation to the imitability of 
heroes has to do with the contexts in which most of us are supposed to live and exercise their virtues, 
which are often different from—i.e. distant from—the contexts typical of heroic deeds. I cannot wait 
to exercise courage until I am in the situation of having to rescue a child from a burning house as 
heroic firemen do, since (hopefully) I will never be in such a position of having to make this life-
threatening decision. Nor can I wait to exercise humility until I acknowledge that hundreds of people 
shall wish to congratulate me for my heroic deeds, as again the chances that this will happen are 
extremely low, all things considered. Thus, how can emulation be appropriate as a strategy of becoming 
more virtuous if we will almost never have to do anything like the actions for which we admire heroes? 
Zagzebski addresses this worry when she contends that admiration does not make us want to 
replicate the hero’s actions specifically; rather, it makes us want to be ‘the kind of person who would be 
capable of doing’ something as virtuous as the hero’s acts in whatever circumstances we find ourselves 
(2017: 20). To put it differently, one further reason why the exemplarist dynamic requires conscientious 
reflection on the part of the novice—and the educator’s support in the early stages of their moral 
development—is that they need to understand how they can imitate the hero’s actions and motives in 
different contexts. 
Supposing this will suffice as a reply to the first consideration, a second worry concerns the 
possibility that one does not want to emulate moral heroes, as it is too risky. One way or the other, 
heroism involves taking a virtuous decision when something deeply valuable is at stake, be it someone’s 
life, profound desires, career prospects, or personal relationships. Despite our admiration for how the 
hero faces these risks, it might look paradoxical—or at least disproportionate—that in order to acquire 
the virtues, novices are supposed to desire, judge, and behave like people who are already capable of 
dealing with such risks. 
To my knowledge, exemplarists have one interesting and reasonable way to address at once 
both this worry (i.e. with the desire to emulate heroes) and the previous worry (i.e. with the possibility 
of emulating saints). A key suggestion is offered in the following remark by Zagzebski: 
 
Moral improvement comes in stages, and if we aim too high at the outset, we may set 
ourselves up for failure. Direct imitation of the exemplar may come only after a person 
has reached a certain level of moral development. Before that, we do better at imitating 
persons who are better than we are, but not so much better that we cannot clearly see the 
path to becoming like the exemplar (2017: 25). 
 
As should be clear from this passage, Zagzebski seems to contemplate the possibility that, at some early 
stages of moral development, her own categories of moral exemplars might not facilitate the novice’s 
path toward virtue.4 Several commentators (Croce 2019; Croce and Vaccarezza 2017; Han et al. 2017; 
Szutta 2019) have seriously considered this remark and have suggested that we should broaden the 
 
4 I take this remark to provide further support for the project of liberalizing the traditional account of moral exemplars.  
 7 
domain of moral exemplars. In particular, Han et al. (2017) have shown that novices are less willing to 
engage with the virtuous deeds of historic exemplars than they are with attainable and relevant 
exemplars—that is, with figures who provide the novices with the perception that emulating them is 
within their reach and who exercise the virtues in situations familiar to the novices. 
 The pars destruens of my argument has shown that if exemplarism is meant to have a concrete 
educational import, as Zagzebski claims, then we need to reconsider the boundaries of the domain of 
moral exemplarity, in that we might have reasons against deploying moral saints and moral heroes in 
the exemplarist dynamic. In the pars construens, I shall outline two fundamental directions in which those 
boundaries should be broadened. 
 
3.3. Enkratic Exemplars and Injustice Illuminators 
 
The first non-standard case of moral exemplarity I want to propose is represented by what I will call 
enkratic exemplars. The enkratês in Aristotle’s ethics (NE VII) is someone who acts in accordance with 
reason but experiences a feeling that is contrary to reason. As such, enkrateia—i.e. continence—is 
morally worse than virtue in that the latter involves no internal conflict within the agent to act in 
accordance with reason. It is precisely for this reason—i.e. the fact that the enkratês struggles to do the 
right thing—that enkratic exemplarity could constitute a decisive step in virtue development on an 
exemplarist approach, or so I shall argue. Let me offer two cases of enkratic exemplars which could 
suggest how these figures might be deployed in educational settings. 
 On the one hand, an educator might present the novices with a tale like the following: To reach 
his workplace, every morning Dave gets on a train that stops in several touristy areas. He is regularly 
asked for information by visitors from all countries. Dave is annoyed by their presence and continued 
requests and feels the desire to ignore them or pretend not to speak any language they would 
understand. Despite struggling with himself, usually he decides to help the visitors out and address their 
queries. On the other hand, opportunities for shedding light on enkratic exemplarity might easily arise 
out of little episodes in the everyday life of a classroom. For example, a student who finds something 
another classmate has lost and returns it despite feeling the desire to keep it for themselves would 
amount to a good case of an enkratic exemplar in an ordinary setting.  
 As should be evident, enkrateia cannot be a mark of moral exemplarity for someone who 
already knows how to master passions and desires when they conflict with reason. Those who 
relentlessly and happily help out any person in need around them and those who never have the feeling 
to keep any found item for themselves will not see anything special—more precisely, admirable—in 
Dave’s and the student’s behavior. However, the moral population encompasses other categories of 
individuals, such as vicious agents, akratic individuals—i.e. those who experience a feeling that is 
contrary to reason and who often act in accordance with that feeling despite being aware that they are 
going against reason—and children who are approaching moral considerations about the relationship 
between passions and reason for the first time. My contention is that for these categories of the moral 
population, enkratic individuals might constitute a legitimate kind of moral exemplars, if not the most 
appropriate one.  
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What makes them suitable for moral exemplarity from an educational standpoint is the 
particular combination of admirability, imperfection, and the struggle they display. Their imperfection 
is evident in the fact that acting well is neither natural nor easy for them, but at the same time, it is also 
a clue of relevance and attainability, to stick with the terminology of Han et al. (2017). Moreover, their 
struggle provides the novice with an opportunity to reflect on the interaction between reasons and 
passions, starting with exemplars whose actions are likely to be much closer to the novice’s everyday 
experience than the typical narratives of moral heroes and saints.  
 One might worry that this whole idea of enkratic individuals as moral exemplars goes against 
the exemplarist approach in that the admiration towards them cannot be fitting if we just remind 
ourselves that they fall short of moral virtue. Let me try to appease this critic with two considerations. 
First of all, to fulfill the admiration stage in the exemplarist dynamic we need motivating admiration, that 
is, an emotion that generates the desire to imitate the exemplar and activates positive attitudes and 
reasoning about their moral virtuousness. As I have tried to argue in §3.2, it is far from clear that 
motivating admiration is what we can expect from novices when we present them with moral heroes 
and moral saints: quite to the contrary, there is a fair chance that admiration for those figures will 
backfire and actually discourage the novices.  
Secondly, there is surely something admirable about the behavior of enkratic individuals: first, 
they act well; second, they do so out of good motives; third and most importantly, they do so as a result 
of an inner struggle. This shall suffice to conclude that whenever a child, an akratic agent, or a vicious 
one admires an enkratic exemplar, their admiration fits its object. A similar verdict has implications for 
Zagzebski’s cognitivist view of emotions. For one thing, it suggests that an emotion’s fittingness might 
depend not only on the feeling and the object towards which the feeling is directed, but also on the 
agent’s perspective—in the case of admiration, on their moral position. This explains why admiration 
towards enkratic exemplars is fitting for the aforementioned categories of agents, but not for those who 
are at later stages in moral development. For another, it suggests that an emotion’s fittingness might 
admit of degrees, with enkratic exemplars sitting near the low end of the spectrum and moral saints 
near the high end. 
The proposed liberalization of moral exemplarity also has wider implications for the exemplarist 
dynamic. As regards the third stage, it goes without saying that the imitability of enkratic exemplars is 
somewhat limited, as there is nothing in their behavior that those who already master passions should 
emulate. Yet, emulating enkratic exemplars could constitute a reasonable path for vicious and akratic 
individuals to abandon their bad habits and move closer to moral virtue. Furthermore, regardless of 
their imitability, exposure to enkratic exemplars can lead novices, akratics, and vicious agents to 
increase the awareness of their limitations and start questioning their behavior: no doubt this 
constitutes an essential building block in the path towards becoming virtuous. This analysis of enkratic 
individuals made a case for the idea that less-than-virtuous agents can count as moral exemplars and, 
more generally, that the educational function of moral exemplars goes beyond the standard model of 
virtue development by emulation.  
The second non-standard case of moral exemplarity I shall offer puts further pressure on 
emulation as the third stage of the exemplarist dynamic and is constituted by what I shall call injustice 
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illuminators. Injustice illuminators are people who shed light on relations of oppression in a community, 
such as ‘the invisibilization of certain phenomena, experiences, problems, and even entire subjectivities’ 
(Medina 2013: 192). Typically, injustice illuminators are members of oppressed groups and display what 
Josè Medina calls meta-lucidity, namely an awareness of the effects of oppression in our social structures 
and the limitations of dominant ways of seeing within our communities (2013: §5).  
Before accounting for why we should make room for injustice illuminators in our theory of 
moral exemplarity, I shall clear the ground of a preliminary worry and explain why I have decided not 
to stick to Medina’s original label of ‘epistemic heroes’ (186) to identify those who excel in meta-
lucidity. I can offer two reasons in favor of this choice, which is more conceptual than terminological in 
spirit. The first reason is that injustice illuminators need not be epistemic heroes. According to Medina, 
epistemic heroes are extraordinarily courageous and meta-lucid ‘subjects who under conditions of 
epistemic oppression are able to develop epistemic virtues with a tremendous transformative potential’ 
(186). Rosa Parks is a paradigmatic case of an epistemic hero, namely one who left an unforgettable 
mark in the history of the civil rights movement by refusing to give up a bus seat to a white man who 
was requesting her to move, in Alabama in 1955. However, an injustice illuminator can well be a 
student or a colleague who manages to cast light on some sort of small-scale discrimination that has 
been perpetrated in the classroom or workplace, yet it is not required that their virtuous intervention 
has the ‘tremendous transformative potential’ Medina has in mind when he talks about epistemic 
heroes. Thus, while epistemic heroes are injustice illuminators by definition, the opposite is not true.  
The second reason is that the contribution of injustice illuminators goes well beyond the 
epistemic domain and therefore considering them as mere epistemic exemplars will not do justice to 
these individuals. I cannot go further into whether epistemic heroes can count as moral exemplars: my 
inclination is that they do so, but Medina is clear that the contribution they give pertains to the 
epistemic domain. All I need to make my point about injustice illuminators is to highlight that their 
contribution towards calling out instances of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007) encompasses both an 
epistemic and an ethical dimension. As Fricker clearly points out (122-ss), the phenomenon of 
epistemic (in)justice is hybrid in nature, in that it has to do with (a lack of) truth and (in)justice at the 
same time. Thus, there seems nothing wrong in considering injustice illuminators as moral exemplars 
insofar as their acts contribute to counteracting unjust dynamics or restoring just practices within a 
given community.  
Having clarified why we should not reduce the notion of an injustice illuminator to that of 
epistemic heroes, we can now explain why a theory of moral exemplarity should make room for 
injustice illuminators. As I have done for enkratic exemplars, I shall argue that the behavior of injustice 
illuminators is both admirable in some respects and conducive to the moral development of the novices 
who admire them.  
The activity of injustice illuminators can be unpacked as follows: first, they have the ability to 
see what is morally and/or epistemically unjust about a given situation, relationship, or social structure; 
second, they realize how members of a community might be blind to the problem—that is, by failing to 
notice the wrong—if not part of the problem themselves—e.g. by being those who perpetrate the 
wrong; and third, they find a way to reveal such wrong, to make it evident in the relevant community. 
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Doing so requires both courage and meta-lucidity, that is, two character traits for which injustice 
illuminators are worthy of our admiration. However, there is a clear limit to their imitability, in that one 
cannot simply choose to be part of an oppressed group and therefore one cannot decide to emulate the 
deeds of those who are sensitive to injustices and discrimination because they have suffered (or are 
suffering) them. 
Thus, one might worry that injustice illuminators cannot be moral exemplars if the emotion of 
admiration we might experience towards them fails to elicit emulation—at least for those members of a 
community who do not belong to an oppressed minority. In fact, this should be the verdict issued by a 
traditional exemplarist approach. A liberal account, though, can accommodate the idea that injustice 
illuminators are moral exemplars insofar as the encounter with these figures motivates those who 
admire them to reflect on the problem highlighted, changing their attitudes towards the victims of 
injustice, and elaborating ways of counteracting the injustice. Although, strictly speaking, only other 
members of oppressed groups may emulate them, what makes them exemplars is the contribution they 
make towards fostering human flourishing. They might not allow us to develop the virtues they display 
as we would expect from models of what I shall call direct exemplarity, but they still allow us to get closer 
to moral virtue, as models of indirect exemplarity can well do. 
An opponent of the liberal account of moral exemplarity might want to object that the 
proposed distinction between direct and indirect forms of exemplarity just is an ad hoc maneuver to 
avoid the evident problem that injustice illuminators do not fit the exemplarist dynamic. As a reply to 
this objection, I shall point out that support for the idea of indirect exemplarity can be found in 
Archer’s (2019) recent account of admiration. As he clearly argues, Zagzebski’s emulation view of 
admiration—i.e. the thesis that admiration is meant to provide motivation for emulating the object of 
admiration—is problematic: on the one hand, it is committed to the idea that the object of admiration 
can only be human beings, while there seems to be no principled reason why we could not also admire 
nonhuman animals and objects;5 on the other, it unduly restricts the range of appropriate responses to 
admiration to a desire to emulate the object of admiration. As a more promising alternative, Archer 
puts forth and defends the value promotion view of admiration, according to which ‘in prototypical 
cases of admiration, an agent who experiences admiration will be motivated to promote the value(s) 
that they admire in the object of their admiration’ (146). 
Once we acknowledge that ‘a desire to emulate is one of several ways in which admiration 
typically motivates’ (148), it becomes evident that indirect exemplars and, in particular, injustice 
illuminators can be legitimately considered as moral exemplars. As I have argued, admiration for them 
promotes a range of morally valuable achievements such as raising one’s sensitivity to epistemic and 
moral injustice and eliciting counteracting attitudes to prevent the perpetration of unjust social 
dynamics. Furthermore, as Sherman (2016) has it, the process of changing attitudes towards the victims 
of injustice and elaborating ways to counteract it requires developing and deploying other virtues, such 
as vigilance, humility, and conscientiousness. These considerations motivate the conclusion that 
injustice illuminators can count as moral exemplars and therefore provide support for a liberal account 
of moral exemplarity, as injustice illuminators amount to a case of non-imitable moral exemplars. 
 
5 See also Korsgaard (2019) on the distinction between human beings as exemplars and exemplary things. 
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4. Conclusion: Advantages of a Liberal Account of Moral Exemplarity 
 
Let me summarize the main take-home messages of the liberalizing project I have undertaken in the 
previous section and stress the implications of the proposed arguments for the exemplarist dynamic. 
After showing in the pars destruens of my argument that moral saints and heroes might not fit the 
exemplarist dynamic as Zagzebski thought, in the pars construens I signaled two directions in which the 
standard account of moral exemplarity should be liberalized if we care about its applicability in 
educational contexts. On the one hand, I showed that moral virtue is not a necessary requirement of 
moral exemplarity, as enkratic individuals can be moral exemplars for young children as well as akratic 
and vicious adults. On the other, I showed that imitability is not a necessary feature of moral 
exemplars, in that injustice illuminators can be considered exemplars despite the fact that most of us 
will never be in a position to emulate their behavior.  
My proposal calls for a liberalization of the exemplarist dynamic, for considering emulation as 
the only appropriate motivational response to admiration is unduly restrictive. The liberal approach is 
more promising in that it allows us to be pluralist about the ways in which the encounter with moral 
exemplars can promote moral value. Whenever emulation is not a realistic opportunity, exposure to 
moral exemplars may still allow novices to change their attitudes towards some morally relevant 
circumstances or find ways of counteracting injustice. Both activities are in fact likely to promote virtue 
development as not only Zagzebski but also proponents of character education expect from an 
exemplarist approach to moral education. 
As a final remark, let me stress that the liberal account I have defended herein has an important 
virtue, namely the fact that it is not just liberal from a theoretical standpoint, but it is also liberating from 
an educational perspective. For starters, the idea that emulation should not always be the expected 
outcome of a novice’s interaction with moral exemplars frees novices from the ambiguity of not 
knowing whether they should become able to replicate the exemplar’s deeds. The account further 
reduces the pressure on novices by showing that a realistic path towards human flourishing might 
require intermediate steps in which they should be exposed to enkrateia rather than exceptional virtue. 
Finally, the account is also liberating for educators, who need not necessarily present novices with 
almost-flawless exemplars and then deal with the side effects of an admiration that backfires, but who 
can rather resort to more manageable exemplars insofar as they are relevant, attainable, and sometimes 
even less-than-virtuous characters.  
As anticipated in §3.1, nothing I have argued in this paper commits Zagzebski and proponents 
of standard moral exemplarism to give up on any of their theoretical cornerstones. That said, I am also 
convinced that my arguments suffice to motivate the need for a more plausible and effective 
educational application of the exemplarist moral theory.6  
 
 
6 I am grateful to Johan Dahlbeck and Morten Korsgaard for including my work in this special issue. I would also like to thank 
the audience at the workshop “Exemplars in Arendt and Spinoza: Insights for Moral Exemplarism and Education” (University 
of Malmö) for their comments. Work on this article has received funding from the Fundaçao para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 
(FCT, Portugal) under grant agreement CEECIND/02143/2017. 
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